California Governor Jerry Brown just signed a new bill changing the length of the terms of those appointed to the Fair Employment and Housing Council—temporarily. The bill, AB 2780, affects appointments to the Council made on or after January 1, 2017.
The Council is composed of 7 members who serve four-year terms. This new law keeps the terms of 4 members to four years, but the other three members’ terms are changed to two-year terms.
But then it gets more complicated. The new law provides that the new appointments replacing each member initially appointed under the new law upon the completion of their terms will serve a term of four-years.
Which is the way it is now. (Blank stare on my face.)
So what was the purpose of this bill? Well, according to the Assembly Floor Analysis, the purpose of the bill is to stagger the terms of the Council members in order to provide institutional continuity. Which makes sense to me.
Gee, I never thought anything coming from Sacramento would make sense to me, but this one does.
Existing law, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, provides that a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form and defines an electronic signature for purposes of the act. Existing provisions of the Government Code authorize the use of a digital signature in any written communication with a public entity, and specifies that in those communications, the use of a digital signature has the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature if it complies with specified requirements.
This bill would express the intent of the Legislature to clarify that a digital signature may be used to satisfy the requirements of an electronic signature under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. The bill would, for purposes of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, provide that an electronic signature includes a digital signature under the above described provisions of the Government Code and that a digital signature under those provisions is a type of an electronic signature as set forth in the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act. The bill would also revise the above-described provisions of the Government Code by specifying that if a public entity elects to use a digital signature, that meets specified requirements, the digital signature has the same force and effect of a manual signature in any communication with the public entity.
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Here’s another reminder that a plaintiff in a FEHA case may be ordered to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees if the court finds that “…plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”
There’s still a myth out there that plaintiffs are never liable for defendants’ attorney’s fees, but that’s all it is—a myth.
I have not dog in this fight, but as I wrote previously, Making a Murder was a fantastic and engrossing documentary which I think highlighted Strang’s and Buting’s fine work in defense of Steven Avery. After watching the documentary, I wasn’t convinced one way or another about Avery’s guilt. I just thought I would have liked to have watched the unedited video of the whole trial before making a decision, because who knows what was left on the cutting room floor?
But Steven Avery just convinced me of his guilt with his recent comments about Strand and Buting. Not very often does a criminal defendant get the high level of defense Avery got. If anyone should know this, Avery should, considering what happened to him when he was first wrongfully convicted while receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.
Just look at Avery’s recent letter in which Avery claims, among other things, that Strang and Buting didn’t investigate his case and were just simply protecting the State! At least I think that’s what Avery said. Here’s an excerpt of exactly what he wrote:
10. Dean and Jerry didn’t do no investigation on this case, if they did I would not be in prison, They would have the Suspect if they did there job!!
11. Dean and Jerry all they were doing is predict the state and there lawfirm,
12. Lawyers should be responsible for they wrong doing!!!
13. Lawyers sould loose there license when they dont investigate they case to proof there Client’s and they Violating the Ethics, the State sould take there license for good.
I agree with Steven Avery that criminal defense lawyers that fail to do their jobs should lose their bar cards. It’s all too common and in the criminal justice world, the ramifications for a client or potentially life-threatening.
But for Avery to criticize two attorneys who obviously worked their tails off in his defense just convinces me that Avery has a screw loose and is probably guilty of the murder. What’s amazing and what Avery fails to understand is that the fact that reasonable people are arguing over Avery’s innocence in the case speaks volumes on how effective Strang and Buting were.
Of course, it’s easy for me to say this because I have not ever been wrongfully convicted of a crime as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, then years later being freed, only to find myself in prison again. But hopefully one day Avery will realize he was the beneficiary of the diligence and persistence of his two fine trial attorneys. And I bet his current attorney, Kathleen Zellner, will benefit from their hard work in her current defense of Avery.
I think what really bothers me about Avery’s comments is the “cry wolf” issue. Not every inmate in prison is there because if incompetent counsel. But a lot of inmates think that, regardless of their true innocence or guilt.
Here’s a couple of cases from Nevada about a real claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, if you want to know how bad it can get. Read these and weep.
I regularly read the California Appellate Report blawg authored by Professor Shaun Martin of the University of San Diego Law School. I read his blawg because it’s entertaining and it’s much more pleasant than scouring through the courts’ websites looking for interesting cases.
In a recent post, Prof. Martin discussed a “neat little dissent” by my favorite Ninth Circuit judge, Judge Kozinski. In that case, Judge Kozinski was worked-up over having to deal with another long brief. I love Prof. Martin’s take on Kozinski’s hortatory.
Briefs are often longer than they need to be and that’s because it’s more difficult to write a concise and persuasive brief than to write a brief just throwing in a lot of case law without really thinking about what is really relevant and necessary to the argument.
About 20 years ago I had a case before the Nevada Supreme Court. And I think the Supreme Court rule limited briefs to 35 pages. My brief was less than 10 pages, but my opponent’s brief was exactly 35 pages and it was all italicized and boldfaced! The whole brief!
I wonder what Judge Kozinski would say about that.
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A California plaintiff files a racial discrimination complaint with the EEOC alleging racial discrimination against his employer. The EEOC then files a copy of the complaint with the DFEH under their work-sharing agreement. DFEH issues an immediate right-to-sue letter which gives plaintiff the right to file a lawsuit in state court within one year. EEOC investigates the claim and a couple of years later issues a letter of determination stating there is reasonable cause to believe plaintiff suffered from racial discrimination. Then, a few months later, EEOC sends out its own right-to-sue letter after the case doesn’t settle. Ninety-seven days later, plaintiff sues his employer in California Superior Court.
Did plaintiff miss the FEHA statute of limitations? No. Even though plaintiff missed the federal 90-day limitations period after receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter, that was irrelevant. What is relevant, is plaintiff’s limitations period under FEHA was tolled during the time in which EEOC was investigating his claim. So the statute did not start running on plaintiff’s FEHA claims until the EEOC issued its determination letter.
This is called “equitable tolling.” Having just dealt with equitable tolling in a nightmare federal habeas corpus case, I know all about it!
(The justifications for equitable tolling in the FEHA context and the federal AEDPA law are essentially the same, in case you’re wondering.)
Anyway, this is a relatively common fact pattern and I am not surprised at the court’s decision in applying equitable tolling.
But what did surprise me was how the case got to the Court of Appeal. And I won’t go through all of the sordid details here, but it involves demurrers, a petition for writ of mandate, an alternative writ of mandate, new orders, hearings, motions for consideration, well…it is simply crazy and a waste of time. I think the Court of Appeal finally got it right, but procedurally it was a nightmare which could have been avoided.
Governor Jerry Brown recently announced his appointment of attorney Holly A. Thomas to be the new deputy director of executive programs at DFEH.
Thomas is certainly credentialed having been special counsel to the solicitor general at the New York Attorney General’s Office, among other things.
Here’s the text of Governor Brown’s announcement:
Holly A. Thomas, 36, of Brooklyn, New York, has been appointed deputy director of executive programs at the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Thomas has been special counsel to the solicitor general at the New York State Attorney General’s Office since 2015. She served as a senior attorney in the Appellate Section of the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice from 2010 to 2015 and was an assistant counsel at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. from 2005 to 2010, where she was a fellow with the Arthur Liman Public Interest Program from 2005 to 2006. Thomas served as a law clerk for the Honorable Kim McLane Wardlaw at the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit from 2004 to 2005. Thomas earned a Juris Doctor degree from Yale Law School. This position does not require Senate confirmation and the compensation is $133,008. Thomas is a Democrat.
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Unfortunately this has become a common practice. I see it more and more.
Considering that California is an employment at will state, it still amazes me that many of these large employers, armed with armies of lawyers, will harass and lie to older employees it wants to get rid of. Most of these cases wouldn’t be worth filing if the employer treated the employee well. Most employees know they can be fired, but they can be fired with dignity. But these lawyered-up employers often make the mistake of thinking they have to come up with a reason to get rid of employees they’re tired of or are paying too much, so they cook up some reasons to “justify” a termination.
Stupid, stupid, stupid. Especially to treat a long-term dedicated employee like some kind of undesirable cretin and kicking him/her out the door.
Gee, what about treating the employee with dignity and respect? And if there’s a business reason to terminate an employee, especially a long-term employee, how about a generous severance package and a proper send away? How about a “thank you?”
I bet B.E. Aerospace now wishes it would have thought of that.
B/E Aerospace is a leading manufacturer of aircraft interior products and solutions, and leading distributor of aerospace fasteners and consumables for the commercial business jet and military markets. A career here is beyond what you would expect in a job. (emphasis added!)
At B/E, your ideas, talents, and experiences reach beyond day-to-day duties. They are also used to shape a global organization. This is your opportunity to make a real difference each day and be a part of something bigger than any single individual. You can be a part of a global team that is always looking ahead.
Open the Door to Success.
We know the best view of B/E is from the inside. Come explore the pride, commitment, and value that a career at B/E Aerospace can bring to your professional experience. (I suggest allowing plaintiff to be the tour guide.)
What a joke!
I think the website should bear a prominent disclaimer. Here’s a suggestion:
Warning! Long-term dedicated employees are likely to have their reputations sullied and are subject to unceremonious termination when BE Aerospace determines the time is right. Applicants over 40 years old and women should consider this when applying.
Congratulations to Maryann Gallagher for her righteous victory.
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When I evaluate a potential employment case, it’s always nice when there’s a cause of action under FEHA that provides for attorney’s fees. That gives plaintiff leverage in settlement discussions. Smart defense counsel will advise their clients that if plaintiff wins at trial, depending on the case, the attorney’s fees can sometimes dwarf the jury’s verdict. Especially if unwise defense counsel plays games and resists discovery requiring motions to compel, files a motion for summary judgment with hundreds of pages of exhibits that has no chance of prevailing, etc… all to simply increase billings and make it appear to defense counsel’s client that defense counsel is being “aggressive.”
But what happens if plaintiff loses in a case where it’s clear the client will lose? One of the FEHA myths is that plaintiff never has to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees, even when plaintiff loses. But that’s not the case – as the Second District Court of Appeal reminds us in a recent unpublished decision.
In this case plaintiff, a 31-year employee of Liberty Mutual, filed a lawsuit under FEHA alleging ethnic origin discrimination and retaliation along with other related causes of action after being terminated. Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment arguing in part that plaintiff’s DFEH administrative complaints were insufficient. Plaintiff then filed amended DFEH complaints, but the court said that in two of the three amended complaints, plaintiff made false allegations about the dates of the discrimination.
Well, the trial court ordered the FEHA causes of action stricken because plaintiff pursued them in bad faith. Plaintiff then tried to file her case in federal court, but apparently that didn’t go well.
So guess what? Defendant decided to file a motion for attorney’s fees under the prevailing party provision of FEHA—California Government Code § 12965(b). Smartly, Liberty Mutual only asked for fees for the time between the its motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of the FEHA causes of action, and only 5/8ths of its fees incurred during that time, since only 5 of the 8 causes of action were under FEHA.
So what did plaintiff do? Well, she didn’t argue that she pursued these claims in good faith or that the fees sought were excessive. Instead, she argued that the motion was premature since the court had not ordered summary judgment, the court had only stricken her FEHA claims, so, technically, Liberty Mutual was not a prevailing party.
But the court granted Liberty Mutual’s motion for attorney’s fees for $78,681 with payment stayed until the end of the lawsuit.
And then the lawsuit ended when the court granted summary judgment.
And plaintiff appealed, and lost. And now plaintiff owes Liberty Mutual’s lawyers $78,681 and Liberty Mutual’s costs on appeal.
The moral of this story for plaintiff’s attorneys and their clients is when you get a case that looked good but once discovery commences and things go south, don’t try to raise a sinking ship. Get out as fast as possible. You’ll be thankful to cut your losses, and so will your client. Because if you don’t, you won’t get paid and your client will paying your opposing counsel.
California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reversed a summary judgment for defendant employer in a lengthy opinion which made me wonder, “What was the trial judge thinking?”
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the court reversed summary judgment on five causes of action and sustained summary adjudication on only one cause of action.
Plaintiff sued her employer for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation in violation of FEHA, retaliation and interference in violation of CFRA. The only claim plaintiff lost on was the retaliation claim under FEHA and that was only because the law changed after the events described in the complaint occurred, and the change in the law did not apply retroactively.
This is a fairly typical disability discrimination case in which an employee informs her employer that she has a medical condition and then the employer does everything it can to make the employee’s life difficult, eventually leading to a convenient RIF layoff. (That’s what they always say.)
I won’t get into all the details here, but this opinion does have a good discussion of pretext, and it’s definitely worth a read.
This is a good case because of the factual details and the court’s analysis. It’s a keeper, and a win for plaintiffs.
It also makes me wonder what the hell is going on at the Great Bastion of Progressivism, The University of California system. It seems almost a daily occurrence that some professor is sexually harassing a student or something. And they’re not even frat boys!